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Abstract:) This article demonstrates the value of studying interactions in transnational business
governance (TBG) and proposes an analytical framework for that purpose. The number of TBG
schemes involving non-state authority to govern business conduct across borders has vastly
expanded in a wide range of issue areas. As TBG initiatives proliferate, they increasingly interact
with one another, and with state-based and other normative regimes. The key challenge is to
understand the implications of TBG interactions for regulatory capacity and performance – the
most fruitful initial focus – and ultimately for the impacts of regulation on social and
environmental problems. To gain purchase on these complex issues, the article develops an
original framework that disaggregates the regulatory process, focusing on the points at which
interactions may occur and suggesting, for each point, a series of analytical questions that probe
the key features of TBG interactions.
!
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This paper was prepared, and is ultimately destined for publication, as the introductory article in a special issue of
the journal Regulation & Governance on transnational business governance interactions. Except for this introduction
and a commentary by Tim Bartley, the papers in the special issue were first presented in May, 2011 at a workshop at
the European University Institute in Florence entitled "Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Theoretical
Approaches, Empirical Contexts and Practitioners’ Perspectives." The workshop was a joint initiative of the TBGI
project and the Transnational Private Regulation (TPR) project funded by the Hague Institute for
Internationalization of Law (principal investigator Fabrizio Cafaggi). The workshop received financial support from
Arizona State University, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and the TPR project. The authors are
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Introduction
An increasing portion of business regulation emanates not from conventional state and interstate institutions but from an array of private sector, civil society, multi-stakeholder and hybrid
public-private institutions operating in a dynamic, transnational regulatory space. Accounting
standards, fair trade labels, forestry certification schemes, labor rights monitoring, transparency
standards for extractive industries, and many more: transnational business governance (TBG)
has grown in scope and importance as production, consumption and their impacts have
globalized and as states reconsider established modes of regulation. Scholars have devoted
substantial attention to the emergence, forms, legitimacy and effectiveness of individual TBG
initiatives. As TBG schemes proliferate, however, it has become clear that they do not operate in
isolation. Rather, they interact with one another, and with other normative regimes, state-based
and non-state, in highly diverse ways.
Consider two examples. In forestry, industry-based sustainable forestry certification
schemes have emerged alongside the more NGO-based Forest Stewardship Council (FSC).
Interactions between the FSC and its industry-based alternatives are often competitive (e.g.
Meidinger 1999; Cashore et al. 2004; Overdevest 2010), but they also exhibit considerable
coordination and institutional mimicry (Gulbrandsen 2010; Fransen 2012). Moreover, while all
these schemes have long interacted with state regulation in various ways (Meidinger 2001), new
interactive possibilities have been created by recent European and American legislation requiring
that all imported wood products must have been harvested legally in their source countries.
Three papers in this special issue explore these possibilities (Bartley; Cashore & Stone;
Overdevest & Zeitlin).
Food safety regulation involves a broader set of actors organized around diverse market
chains and playing highly differentiated and intertwined roles. Iizuka and Borbon-Galvez (2009)
describe a complex interactive system in which Latin American food safety standards are
formulated by varied transnational non-state organizations, adopted by diverse state agencies,
and implemented by combinations of local government officials and businesses (Meidinger
2009). Governance is thus performed by a wide range of actors, each constantly taking account
of the others’ activities.
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Transnational business governance interactions (TBGI) are ripe for systematic attention.
By “interactions” we mean the myriad ways in which governance actors and institutions2 engage
with and react to one another. Researchers have begun to examine isolated aspects of the
phenomenon – for example, interactions between TBG schemes and official legal systems, or
specific cases of inter-scheme competition or isomorphism. However, our knowledge of these
interactions, and hence of their role in larger regulatory systems, remains incomplete. What are
the drivers, mechanisms and pathways of interaction? What are its outputs, outcomes and
impacts? Without addressing such questions, it is impossible to assess the full implications of
TBG, including whether TBG schemes are racing one another to the top or the bottom and
whether their interactions reinforce or undermine efforts to achieve regulatory goals such as
sustainable development.
We argue that the study of TBG interactions and their effects is a promising research
program and propose an analytical framework for furthering that program. TBG is characterized
by heterogeneous actors possessing various regulatory capacities, acting within diverse
institutional contexts, seeking to influence the allocation and exercise of regulatory authority,
and performing a range of regulatory tasks throughout the policy cycle, from agenda-setting and
rule formation to compliance promotion and sanctioning. This implies a high degree of
interaction – within and among TBG schemes, and between TBG schemes and state-based
regulation. Interactions occur at multiple levels (e.g., of individual actors, TBG schemes or
entire governance complexes), take many forms (e.g., competition, imitation or steering), have
varied effects on regulatory outputs, outcomes and impacts, and exhibit temporal dynamics (e.g.
diffusion, divergence and adaptation).
Building on these assumptions, we propose an analytical framework to facilitate investigation
of the drivers, forms, causal mechanisms and pathways of TBGI, and their effects on regulatory
2

For our purposes, institutions are cognitive and normative structures that facilitate and constrain behaviour.
Examples include economic and political infrastructures; taken-for-granted social rules of behaviour; and
international regimes and regime complexes (Ikenberry 1988; Jepperson 1991; Scott 2001; DiMaggio and Powell
1991; North 1990; Krasner 1982; Raustiala & Victor 2004). We distinguish institutions from actors, which are
individuals and organizations capable of taking goal-oriented action. While some institutions are largely
disconnected from organizations, others – and these are the ones we will mainly focus on - are predominantly
structured around organizations, which embody the larger (institutional) normative and cognitive framework (e.g.,
Hodgson 2006). A key point for present purposes is that both institutions and actors can interact.
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capacity, performance and outcomes. We do not specify a particular theoretical orientation or
methodological approach. We believe that theoretical and methodological diversity is essential
in dealing with as complex a phenomenon as TBGI. Our objective is to offer an analytical
framework that can mobilize a range of theoretical approaches in a shared research program.
The papers in this special issue advance the TBGI research agenda. Drawing on rich and
well-researched empirical contexts, notably forestry governance, natural resource management
and global finance, these papers collectively make a substantial contribution toward better
understanding the under-explored phenomenon of TBGI and its role in global governance. The
article is organized as follows. Section 1 defines TBG (1.1), and TBG interactions (1.2). Section
2 reviews recent scholarship on TBG (2.1) and TBG interactions (2.2) to extract implications for
our research program (2.3). Section 3, the core of the article, presents our analytical framework.
Section 4 concludes briefly.

1. TBGI:)The)Nature)of)the)Beast)
1.1#Transnational#Business#Governance#
Building on standard accounts of transnational relations (Hale & Held 2011; Keohane &
Nye 1971; Risse-Kappen 1995), transnational business governance (TBG) refers to systematic
efforts to regulate business conduct that involve a significant degree of non-state authority in the
performance of regulatory functions across national borders. TBG is longstanding in certain
domains, including accounting (Camfferman & Zeff 2006), electricity (Büthe 2010b), product
standards (Perry 1955) and kosher food (Starobin & Weinthal 2010). Since World War II,
however, TBG initiatives have expanded to include not just “technical” (interoperability)
standards aimed at reducing transaction costs (e.g. ,internet protocols) but also quality standards
and, increasingly, “regulatory” standards aimed at reducing externalities (Abbott & Snidal 2001).
These range from food safety risks (consumption externalities) to worker safety and
environmental harms (production externalities). As their scope has broadened, transnational
codes of conduct, certification and labeling schemes, reporting mechanisms and the like have
emerged in ever-increasing numbers.
The “transnational” in TBG refers to arrangements that cross national borders and involve
the exercise of a significant degree of authority by non-state actors. In this regard, “state”
denotes actors based in the institutions of the state, including (in contrast to the approaches of
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some scholars) intergovernmental, supra-national and trans-governmental structures. We focus
on initiatives in which non-state actors are afforded authority to perform varied regulatory
functions, alone or together with state-based actors (Meidinger 1997; Cashore 2002; Keck &
Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995; Black 2001; Abbott & Snidal 2009 a, b, 2010).
“Business” denotes a focus on the regulation of commercial, industrial or professional
activity in pursuit of socially defined goals. This includes not just regulation of the ultimate
targets but also regulation of intermediaries (e.g. financial institutions) capable of influencing
targets’ behavior, and even meta-regulation of government regulation. Importantly, business
actors are not just targets of TBG. While regulation is always “co-produced” by regulators and
targets insofar as the latter must implement regulation within their organizations (Black 2001), in
TBG firms also exercise authority to perform regulatory functions such as agenda-setting, rulemaking and enforcement.
Although we speak of “governance,” we focus on “regulatory governance.” Defined
broadly, “governance” encompasses all activities performed in conducting the policies or affairs
of a state, organization, network or society (Held & McGrew 2002; Hunt & Wickham 1994;
Kooiman 1993; Rosenau & Czempiel 1992; Rosenau 1997). Like Hale & Held (2011: 12), we
focus on the subset of governance that involves regulation: organized and sustained attempts to
change the behavior of targeted actors to address a collective problem or attain a collective end,
through a combination of rules or norms and means for their implementation and enforcement.
State and non-state actors may engage in regulation and rules may be “hard” or “soft”. As the
term “regulation” is often associated with state-based actions and legal rules, however, we use
the broader term “regulatory governance” (Levi-Faur 2011).
1.2#TBG#Interactions#
What makes our research agenda distinctive is its explicit focus on interactions as an object
of inquiry. This focus is animated partly by the empirical observation that as TBG schemes
proliferate, the frequency, intensity and variety of interactions among them, and with state-based
institutions, increase; and partly by a theoretically-informed expectation that the increasing
complexity of transnational regulatory governance will produce extensive institutional
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interactions, some of which may be novel or problematic (Alter & Meunier 2009; Gehring &
Oberthür 2009).
TBG schemes take diverse forms and involve heterogeneous actors – from individuals to
organizations, technical experts to political entrepreneurs, NGOs to business firms to
government agencies. Pursuing diverse interests, values and beliefs about appropriate forms of
regulation, these actors engage in complex co-regulatory processes. TBG schemes engage in
virtually all of the tasks that constitute regulatory governance, from shaping the regulatory
agenda to enforcing norms (Black 2002; 2003; Abbott & Snidal 2009a, b).
As these diverse schemes multiply, they interact with one another and with state-based
governance. As noted above, we define “interactions” broadly as including all the ways in which
TBG actors and institutions engage with and react to one another and state-based regulatory
actors and institutions. Interactions may be symmetrical or asymmetrical, antagonistic or
synergistic, intentional or unintentional. They may even be unnoticed by some actors. For
example, where one scheme adopts another’s organizational structure or refers to its rules, the
latter may engage in a process of mutual adjustment, may choose not to make any adjustment, or
may even remain wholly unaware of the interaction. Interactions frequently occur among
schemes within a particular sector or issue-area, but they may also occur across domains, as
between trade and the environment (Raustiala & Victor 2004; Gehring 2011).
Competition, sometimes shading into conflict or domination, often occurs in domains
characterized by multiple schemes driven by actors with differing regulatory goals. In forestry,
for example, industry-led certification programs compete for users and legitimacy with the civil
society-driven FSC – even as all these schemes intersect with state regulation (e.g., legality
requirements) and international agreements (e.g., international trade law). Cooperative
interactions also occur, as in extractive industries, where TBG schemes have converged on
norms of information disclosure and transparency (Haufler, this issue). TBG schemes may also
exhibit a division of labor, as in food safety regulation (Meidinger 2009).

2.#Current#Scholarship#
Most scholarship on TBG has focused on particular TBG schemes or types of schemes (2.1).
More recently, scholars have begun to address interactions, applying a wide range of theoretical
perspectives (2.2). This research has significant implications for a TBGI research agenda (2.3).
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2.1#Scholarship#on#TBG#
Much research on TBG has focused on defining the phenomenon, identifying conditions for
its emergence, and evaluating its legitimacy or effectiveness, rather than on interactions (e.g.,
Cutler et al 1999; Hall & Biersteker 2002; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Dingwerth 2007;
Graz & Nölke 2008; Vogel 2009; Büthe 2010a). Most studies examine individual initiatives
within a domain, or compare initiatives across domains, such as accounting and quality
management (Tamm Hallström 2004) or sustainable forestry and fishing (Gulbrandsen 2008,
2010). Many also focus on particular institutional forms, especially state/non-state partnerships
(Bäckstrand 2008; Börzel & Risse 2005; Pattberg 2010; Schäferhoff et al. 2009), and
collaborations among state, business and civil society actors (Abbott & Snidal 2009 a, b; Dilling
2012). Other scholars focus on firms’ motivations to adopt voluntary TBG norms (e.g., Fransen
& Burgoon 2012; Potoski & Prakash 2005). Another important literature addresses the
legitimation dynamics through which TBG initiatives pursue, acquire or lose regulatory authority
(e.g., Tamm Hallström 2004; Wood 2005; Bernstein & Cashore 2007; Black 2008; Meidinger
2008; Quack 2010; Casey & Scott 2011; Richardson & Eberlein 2011).
Taken together, this research provides important insights into who participates in formulating
TBG rules; how schemes verify compliance; how certification bodies mediate between standard
setters and regulatory targets; how schemes seek to legitimize themselves; and the relative roles
of economic incentives, normative commitment and peer pressure in shaping firms’ adherence
and compliance. It does not, however, deal adequately with the complex interactions among
TBG schemes and with other regulators.
2.2#Scholarship#on#Interactions#
Scholarly interest in TBGI began, and remains preoccupied, with the relationship between
TBG schemes and state-based regulation (e.g. Meidinger 2001; Wood 2003; Kingsbury et al.
2005; Schepel 2005; Trubek & Trubek 2007; Eberlein & Newmann 2008; Wood & Johannson
2008; Bartley 2011b). More recent research examines TBGI more broadly, from a variety of
positive and normative perspectives representing nearly the full spectrum of theoretical
orientations in the social sciences.
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Rationalist, actor-centered approaches examine the dynamics of TBGI as bargaining between

rational actors shaped by power. Abbott and Snidal’s (2009a, b) work on state-business-NGO
interactions in the “governance triangle” is an example. Related analyses employ rationalist or
historical institutionalism to examine institutional interactions. Regime and regime complexity
theory highlights relationships among nested, overlapping and parallel regimes in multiple issue
areas (Aggarwal 1998; Raustiala & Victor 2004; Helfer 2004). Analyses of institutional
interaction or “interplay” address institutions’ effects on one another, proposing discrete
pathways and causal mechanisms to explain interaction effects (Gehring & Oberthür 2008, 2009;
Oberthür & Stokke 2011). However, both regime complexity and institutional interaction
research focus primarily on intergovernmental arrangements and on rule promulgation rather
than implementation (Alter & Meunier 2009: 13), albeit with exceptions (Abbott 2012; Auld &
Green 2011; Kelley 2009).
Other scholars emphasize the significance of legitimation in shaping interactions (e.g., Wood
2005; Bernstein & Cashore 2007; Black 2008; Fransen 2012; Gulbrandsen, this issue), or employ
network theory to analyze the inter-organizational and inter-personal aspects of TBGI (e.g.,
Smith & Fischlein 2010; Koppell 2010; Richardson 2009). Still other accounts, rooted in
sociological new institutionalism, posit that interactions are driven less by conscious strategies
than by structural forces arising from the relevant organizational fields (e.g., Bartley 2007b;
Dingwerth & Pattberg 2009). Bartley’s work on labor and environmental standards (2003, 2005,
2007a, 2011a) examines how these “socially constructed arena(s) of self-referencing, mutually
dependent organizations” structure and are structured by TBGI (2007a: 231).
Scholars of law and regulation bring further perspectives to bear on the phenomenon. Perez
(2011) introduces the concept of “ensemble regulation” to characterize the regulatory formations
constituted by multiple links and cross-sensitivities among environmental TBG schemes. He
argues that this ensemble produces positive enforcement and normative externalities even while
limiting the possibility for radical critique. Bomhoff & Meuwese (2011) apply concepts of metaregulation and inter-systemic conflicts to analyze how transnational regulatory initiatives interact
with other normative orders (compare Parker 2002). Herberg (2008) uses the concept of
“interlegality” (Santos 2002) to characterize interactions, bringing the ideational and cultural
dimensions of TBG to the fore. Other scholarship in this vein emphasizes that interactions can
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take place through symbols, concepts and discourses, for example by defining and redefining
“master metaphors” such as sustainability, ecosystem and health (Meidinger 1999).
Another important line of research concerns the outcomes of interactions and their
implications for regulatory effectiveness (Bernauer 1995; Underdal & Young 2004). There is no
consensus whether interactions are predominantly competitive or collaborative. A few analysts
argue that the predominant pattern is simultaneous cooperation and competition, or “coopetition” (e.g., Koppell 2010). Others emphasize competition but disagree whether it leads to a
race to the bottom or top in terms of outcomes. For Cashore et al. (2004: 5), the answer varies
with domestic industry structure, while Overdevest (2004, 2010) argues that public pressure has
ratcheted-up transnational forestry standards via regulatory competition. Smith and Fischlein
(2010) argue that while competition among rival governance networks induces rule convergence,
it also promotes continuing rule innovation and creative solutions to social problems. Meidinger
(2008) speculates that competition for acceptance might create pressure to adopt standards that
respond to or even anticipate public demands, leading TBG schemes toward more transparent,
participatory processes and more ambitious and effective rules.
Others are more pessimistic. Fransen (2011, 2012) and Gulbrandsen (2005, 2010) argue that
upward convergence is largely superficial, masking substantial divergence in standards and
performance. The regime complexity literature emphasizes – excessively, in Overdevest and
Zeitlin’s view (this issue) – negative consequences of interaction, including duplication, lack of
coordination, conflicts arising from rule inconsistencies, and cross-institutional strategic
behaviour such as forum-shopping and regime-shifting (Alter & Meunier 2009, Raustiala &
Victor 2004; Helfer 2004).
A growing literature explores how interactions may be “steered” to promote desired
outcomes. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) use Latour’s (1986) notion of “enrollment” to describe
the construction of TBG regimes. Black (2002, 2003) combines the concepts of enrollment and
regulatory capacity to analyze interactions within the transnational financial regime. Wood
(2003, 2005) employs a governmentality framework to examine steering as a mode of interaction
in the field of environmental management. Abbott and Snidal (2009a, 2010; Abbott et al. 2011;
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Abbott 2012) explore ways in which governance actors might “orchestrate” TBG interactions to
improve regulatory performance.
Others argue that experimentalist processes of benchmarking and learning can promote
desired outcomes (Overdevest & Zeitlin, this issue). Calliess and Zumbansen (2010) suggest a
decentralized steering dynamic in which state, non-state and hybrid regulators seek to identify an
evolving “rough consensus” in light of which they put forward experimental regulatory schemes,
which in turn constitute a “running code” that adapts in response to ongoing feedback. This
process involves constant cross-fertilization, co-evolution, competition and other “intricate
collision[s]” among governance schemes (Zumbansen 2011: 69).
2.3)Implications)for)a)TBGI)Research)Program)
While undoubtedly incomplete, this survey confirms that studying TBGI is a “most
promising research programme” (Herberg 2008: 20). A diverse body of TBGI scholarship is
emerging, yet we still “know too little about these interplays to know what configurations are
stable or potent,” or how multiple regulatory forms co-evolve, hybridize, compete, and reshape
organizational behavior (Schneiberg & Bartley 2008: 51-52).
Exploring TBG interactions poses several analytical challenges. First, interactions take
place, and can be studied, at multiple levels of analysis: the “micro” level of individuals and
organizations, which interact to constitute and govern TBG schemes; the “meso” level of TBG
schemes, which interact with one other and with state-based institutions; and the “macro” level
of regulatory complexes. Similarly, units of analysis can vary from specific dyadic interactions
(Gehring & Oberthür 2009) to larger patterns of interaction within hybrid public-private regime
complexes (Abbott 2012).
Second, analysts must choose whether to study interactions as outcomes or as factors
producing effects. In the former case, they would ask what drives and shapes interactions; in the
latter, what effects interactions have on TBG schemes, regulatory complexes, and regulatory
outputs, outcomes and impacts. Either way, they should identify the mechanisms and pathways
through which both kinds of influences operate (Hedström & Swedberg 1998).
Third, interactions are dynamic and must be analyzed as such. The nature and patterns of
interactions of a scheme in the early days of its inception and stabilization may be distinctly
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different from those which characterize it once it is firmly institutionalized. The entry of new
players can also introduce new patterns of interactions.
A fourth challenge arises from the diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches to
TBGI. As suggested above, analysts may draw predominantly on rationalist accounts, analyzing
TBG interactions as encounters among rational actors with particular interests; they may draw on
structuralist approaches, emphasizing the significance of system-level properties in shaping
interactions; or they may seek to transcend the agency/structure divide. No single approach will
be capable of dealing with the full complexity of these phenomena; there is no one “best” theory.
How then to address these challenges? In the next section, we propose an overarching
analytical framework that disaggregates TBGI into several components, indicates how they relate
to one another, and accommodates a range of theoretical approaches.

3.#TBG#Interactions:#A#Framework#for#Analysis#
As we have emphasized, TBG is a dynamic, co-regulatory and co-evolutionary process,
involving state, non-state and hybrid actors and organizations, which interact at multiple levels
and in multiple ways with a range of effects. These actors and organizations pursue varied
interests, values and goals, and possess differential regulatory capacities: varied endowments of
resources relevant to performing particular regulatory functions. These include, notably,
financial resources, organizational capacity, expertise, authority and legitimacy, and strategic
position, all of which actors use to further regulatory projects they support (Black 2002, 2003;
Abbott & Snidal 2009a).
As noted in Part 1, regulatory governance requires the performance of a range of functions or
roles: (1) framing the regulatory agenda and setting objectives; (2) formulating rules; (3)
implementing rules within the targets of regulation; (4) gathering information and monitoring
behavior; and (5) responding to non-compliance via sanctions and other forms of enforcement
(Black 2002; 2003; Abbott & Snidal 2009a). Each of these can be performed by different actors,
and different resources are useful for each. For example, legitimacy based on representativeness
or sound governance processes may be important for organizations formulating rules, but

13

TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS!

technical expertise may be more important for organizations engaged in monitoring or
information gathering. Strategic position is critical for those trying to change target actors’
behavior, but may be unnecessary if an organization can enroll or orchestrate others to act on its
behalf (Black 2002, 2003; Abbott & Snidal 2009b; Abbott et al. 2011).
Analysis of TBG interactions should take regulatory governance as its starting point.
Scholars should first identify the points in the regulatory process at which interactions occur, and
should then address six central questions for each such point: (1) who or what is interacting; (2)
what drives and shapes interaction; (3) what are the mechanisms and pathways of interaction; (4)
what is the character of interaction; (5) what are the effects of interaction; and (6) how do
interactions change over time? These questions are not exhaustive, and no single study needs to
address all of them. In our view, however, they isolate the key dimensions of the phenomenon.
Together with the aforementioned components of regulatory governance, they provide the
skeleton of our analytical framework, shown in matrix form in Table 1.
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Table#1.#TBG#Interactions:#an#Analytical#Framework##
Component of regulatory governance

Dimension of
interaction

Goal/agenda
setting

Rule formation

Implementation

Monitoring,
information
gathering

Compliance
promotion,
enforcement

Who or what
interacts
Drivers and
shapers
Mechanisms and
pathways
Character of
interaction
Effects of
interaction
Change over
time

This framework accommodates the diversity of actors and organizations involved in TBG,
the multiplicity of drivers, pathways and mechanisms of interaction, the co-evolutionary
interplay between agents’ actions and systemic properties constituting different interaction
characters and effects, and the dynamic nature of interactions. Not every study of TBGI will
investigate all elements of the framework. Researchers may focus on some variables while
bracketing others. The purpose of this article is to provide a framework within which they can
make such choices without losing sight of the whole.
3.1#Who#or#what#is#interacting?#
We have already highlighted the heterogeneity of actors involved in TBG. These actors
perform different regulatory roles at different points in the regulatory process, sometimes
performing multiple roles simultaneously. TBG interactions thus involve numerous actor
combinations, and these must be specified in any analysis. Analysts may need to disaggregate
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generic categories of business, state, and civil society to distinguish between, for example,
retailers and primary producers; transnational corporations and small businesses; targets of
regulation and firms providing services to targets (e.g., auditors); consumer, human rights,
environmental and labour NGOs; actors from the global “North” and “South”; or sub-national,
national and international governmental organizations. Frequently, TBG schemes establish their
own actor categories, which might be useful for analytical purposes.
As noted in Part 2.3, studying TBGI poses a challenge in terms of levels and units of
analysis. This challenge is complicated by the fact that numerous TBG schemes, and many of
the organizations that participate in them, are organizations of organizations and thus not simply
actors but also arenas where interaction occurs. Furthermore, TBG schemes often participate in
rule formation or as rule addressees in other TBG schemes. For example, the FSC and other
major TBG schemes are members of the ISEAL Alliance, a meta-regulatory initiative that sets
standards for social and environmental standards-setters, while the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) and other TBG schemes participated in the development of the ISO 26000 social
responsibility guide.
To render this complexity tractable, we distinguish three levels of analysis. Micro-level
approaches address interactions among individuals and organizations, such as firms and NGOs,
to create and govern TBG schemes. Such an approach might, for example, examine interactions
within a single scheme – among the actors formulating standards, conducting certifications, and
being certified. Meso- level analysis addresses TBG schemes’ interactions with each other and
with state-based institutions, often within an organizational field. Such an approach might, for
example, examine interactions among particular schemes operating within one industry sector
but addressing different issues or involving different actors (e.g. legality and sustainability in
forestry, Bartley, Cashore & Stone, and Overdevest & Zeitlin, this issue; or conflict and
corruption in mining, Haufler, this issue). Finally, macro or systemic analyses address entire
regulatory complexes. Such an approach might examine how a complex constituted by
organizational fields, norms and discourses within one domain (e.g., labor rights) intersects with
other complexes in different domains (e.g., international trade).
At this early stage in TBGI research, there is value in focusing on the middle, “meso-” level.
This level of analysis provides sufficient abstraction to identify patterns and trends, without
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sacrificing empirical detail. It recognizes that TBG schemes are arenas in which individuals,
firms, NGOs and other agents interact; and that they operate within larger regulatory complexes.
Yet it views these relationships from a vantage point that treats TBG schemes themselves as
interacting entities.
We can distinguish further between “horizontal” and “vertical” analyses. A horizontal
analysis at this level might examine interactions among TBG schemes, such as institutional
isomorphism or competition for users. A vertical analysis might examine interactions between a
TBG scheme and its constituent actors, or between a TBG scheme and a larger regulatory
complex. It might inquire into either “upward” processes of interest aggregation and rule
formation, or “downward” processes such as the influence of collective norms on actors’
perceptions, decisions or behavior.
Finally, as to units of analysis, approaches that conceptualize interactions in purely dyadic
terms, such as “target/source” (Gehring & Oberthür 2009) or “principal/agent,” while shedding
light on relationships and influences, will not capture fully the proliferation of actors and
initiatives and their multiple, often-changing interactions. Further, as TBG schemes are unlikely
to emerge in previously ungoverned domains (Bartley 2011b), they will typically have to
navigate around existing initiatives, particularly national legal regimes, although they may seek
to change those systems to accommodate their own norms (e.g., the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association and national bankruptcy laws, Biggins & Scott 2011). Thus, approaches
that emphasize polycentricity and hybridity are likely to be particularly fruitful.
3.2#What#drives#and#shapes#interactions?##
The second element of our framework focuses on the factors that drive and shape
interactions. One possible driver is the structure of the governance problem. Coordination
problems generate different interaction possibilities than do collaboration scenarios. The latter
generate multiple competitive or cooperative possibilities depending on their payoff structures
and the likelihood of future interactions. Free-rider incentives, externalities and other
characteristics of public goods and common pool resources make their governance vulnerable to
competition and conflict, inhibiting cooperation. Transaction costs can also inhibit cooperation.
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Complex global problems like climate change create different possibilities and challenges for
interaction than localized problems like freshwater pollution. In addition, Haufler (this issue)
shows that physical features such as the geographic distribution of natural resources may play a
role in shaping interactions.
Other drivers operate at the actor level. These include actors’ interests, values, perceptions,
knowledge and resources. Alignment of interests and values is a powerful enabler of
cooperation, as misalignment is of conflict. Asymmetrical distribution of information and
resources also influences the likelihood and character of interaction. System-level drivers include
the proliferation and density of governance organizations in particular issue areas: the greater the
number, the greater the likelihood of interaction. More important than sheer numbers, however,
is the degree of overlap and consistency. Schemes may overlap – and exhibit consistency or
inconsistency – in members, rules, issue focus, rule addressees, regulatory functions, etc. One
scheme’s actions may influence others’ strategic choices. As noted earlier, the institutional
interplay and regime complexity literatures tend to emphasize destructive interactions, whereas
experimentalist and legal pluralist scholarship suggests that overlap and inconsistency can be
productive.
Industry characteristics are also important drivers. Ownership concentration, value chain
integration, average firm size, vulnerability to reputational pressures, maturity of the market and
other features can promote different forms of interaction (Cashore et al. 2004). The “market for
regulation” is also significant, including the number of would-be regulators and the maturity of
regulation. If well established governance institutions operate in stable regulatory markets,
governance interactions are likely to be limited.
Interactions are also conditioned by social, economic, technological and political structures
(Callon 1998; Law & Hassard 1999). TBG interactions can be shaped by functional
interdependencies created by technological structures, as in global financial markets (Porter, this
issue). Interactions are also shaped by social networks, lasting patterns of relationships that
serve as channels for the transfer of material or symbolic resources (Thompson 2003).
Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) highlight the role of professional networks, particularly “model
mongers” and “model mercenaries,” in explaining the gradual homogenization of many global
business regulation regimes.
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Finally, cultures, discourses, mentalities, epistemic communities, and other ideational factors
can condition the possibilities for and character of interaction. Regulatory problems are socially
constructed, and thus themselves the product of interactions (Wood 2005). Forest governance
interactions, for example, focus partly on defining the nature of the forest sustainability problem
as a condition for creating and legitimating a governance solution. Such interactions are
influenced by shared understandings of proper forest management, sustainability and community
stability. Importantly, taken-for-granted concepts can shape TBGI while masking power
structures. Governance problems and regulatory solutions are often shaped by dominant
discourses of “sustainable development,” “free markets” and so on, which in turn may favor and
be shaped by powerful business actors (Levy & Newell 2002; Fuchs & Kalfaggiani 2010).
3.3.#What#are#the#mechanisms#and#pathways#of#interaction?#
Rather than simply suggesting that certain factors lead to certain results, analysis of TBGI
should explore the mechanisms and pathways through which such influences operate (Hedström
& Swedberg 1998; Abbott & Snidal, forthcoming). Mechanisms for facilitating and shaping
interaction include organizations (Williamson 1985; Reed 2003), markets (e.g. North, 1990),
networks (e.g. Thompson 2003) and communities (Djelic and Quack 2010), each with its own
social logics. It is worth noting the importance of “sites” of interactions: which mechanisms and
pathways are available is shaped by the specific sites of interaction, i.e. the institutional settings
in which interactions take place. Overlapping membership structures are a common
organizational mechanism by which interactions are shaped in regime complexes. Relational ties
within networks can likewise operate to channel resources, ideas and norms, thus shaping
interactions (True & Mintrom 2001). Epistemic communities provide another pathway for
facilitating and mediating inter-scheme interactions (Haas 1992; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000).
Interactive mechanisms and pathways can operate at different points in the regulatory
governance process. Organizational cross-memberships and social networks may be particularly
influential in framing regulatory agendas, designing standard-setting procedures or determining
the core elements of TBG schemes (e.g., standards, labeling and certification). Gehring and
Oberthür (2009) also identify mechanisms that operate at the level of regulatory outcomes and
on-the-ground impacts.
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Interactions may be effected through direct communication, with individuals or organizations

acting as norm entrepreneurs; or indirectly, through cognitive interactions such as mimicry and
policy learning, in which observation and interpretation, rather than interpersonal
communication, are the central mechanisms. Cognitive interaction occurs when information,
knowledge or ideas produced in one institution modify the perceptions of relevant decisionmakers in another (Gehring & Oberthür 2009). An important aspect of interaction among TBG
schemes is thus the information such schemes produce: for example, analyzing problems,
monitoring and publicizing performance, and communicating views on proper governance.
Indeed, gathering and disseminating information may be among the most important mechanisms
of TBG interaction. TBG schemes may use evidence from state-based or other TBG schemes in
defining and performing their own roles and functions, or in pushing issues onto policy agendas,
mollifying group pressure, searching for optimum policy solutions, or creating legitimacy (Rose
1993; Bennett 1991; Bennett & Howlett 1992; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000).
A range of intermediating actors, including NGOs, consulting firms and certification bodies,
act as pathways of interaction in policy diffusion processes. These actors select and interpret
evidence from other schemes in the same or different domains, adapting it to their ends and
circumstances. In Dorf and Sabel’s (1998) experimentalist governance model, TBG schemes
might be designed, or perceived, as governance experiments; a meta-level overseer evaluates
their performance, taking the best ideas from each experiment to create new governance systems
(Overdevest & Zeitlin, this issue).
One important potential set of mechanisms and pathways that is overlooked in the TBG
literature consists of the tools and techniques of regulatory governance. Meta-regulatory
standards for TBG standards-setting, auditing, accreditation or certification, promulgated by such
meta-organizations as the ISEAL Alliance, ISO and the WTO, are one example. These metaregulatory standards can be important mechanisms of interaction.
Another example is provided by co-regulatory and other enrollment devices by which state
and non-state organizations are harnessed to produce hybrid governance regimes (Abbott &
Snidal 2009b, 2010; Black 2002; Scott 2004). As the “new governance” literature emphasizes,
enrollment occurs at multiple stages of the regulatory process. At the rule-formation stage, a
regulator can adopt the standards of another scheme; for example, the EU has adopted IASB

20!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
OSGOODE!CLPE!RESEARCH!PAPER!SERIES!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!![VOL.!08!NO.06]!
!
accounting rules; the fair trade codes reference ILO rules; and many state regulations incorporate
ISO and Codex standards. One common mechanism of rule interaction is conditional rule
referencing: “if you comply with X’s rule, that will constitute compliance with my regulation.”
Such conditional rule referencing can produce myriad interactions. Importantly, the scheme
whose rules are being adopted may be unaware of the enrollment, far less having consented to it.
Review and accountability procedures, including peer review, are important elements of
monitoring in the regulatory process and thus operate as mechanism of interaction.
Regulatory strategies such as these can thus structure interactions among numerous TBG
schemes, contributing to the creation of multi-layered regulatory complexes (e.g., Cashore &
Stone, this issue; Perez 2011). National laws that stipulate compliance with TBG standards, for
example, produce not only interactions between national regulators and a TBG scheme (Gehring
& Oberthür 2009; Meidinger 2009; Scott 2004; Black, 2002), but also functional
interdependencies which can enhance the capacity of each participant: the TBG scheme gains the
state’s enforcement capacity; the state gains the norm-generating capacity of the scheme; and
each gains the symbolic resources of the other.
Interactions can also occur at the level of regulatory implementation, through the mechanism
of the supply chain. For example, a supplier may face demands from different buyers to conform
to multiple schemes, and so may adopt the most demanding one for all its operations, displacing
the others in practice. Alternatively, the mechanism for interaction may be legal requirements
for firms to comply with multiple state or TBG standards, which conflict or produce adverse
outcomes in combination. For example banks operating in the EU must comply with the rules of
the IASB and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision; in the 2008 financial crisis this
double requirement created a vicious cycle, significantly worsening the crisis (Black 2012).
Such interactions may then prompt interactions between standard-setters, either vertically (e.g., if
politicians become involved) or horizontally between schemes (in this case, the Basle Committee
urged IASB to change its rules).
As Abbott & Snidal (forthcoming) note, mechanisms and pathways are often complex and
intertwined, requiring the development of stylized facts so that descriptive detail does not
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obscure analytical insight; yet they allow analysts to move beyond conjecture about the
implications of TBGI to produce clear, generalizable accounts of the genesis of interactions and
the link between interactions and regulatory outcomes. They represent one of the most
promising avenues to gain analytical purchase on the complex phenomenon of TBGI.
3.4.#What#is#the#character#of#interaction?#
As noted earlier, most scholars emphasize the competitive nature of TBG interactions. Yet
this is only one of several characters of interaction, which fall, roughly speaking, into four
categories:!
•

Competition:!for!regulatory!“turf,”!financing,!reputation,!legitimacy,!adherents!or!
other!benefits.!!Schemes!may!compete!on!price!(e.g.,!certification!costs),!product!
differentiation!(e.g.,!more!or!less!stringent!requirements),!or!other!bases.!!
Competition!may!also!be!nonWmarket,!e.g.,!for!authority!to!define!key!terms!and!
practices.!!

•

Coordination:!ranging!from!emulation!and!mimesis,!to!deliberate!collaboration,!to!
conscious!division!of!labor.!!Coordination!occurs,!among!other!reasons,!as!TBG!
schemes!strive!for!legitimacy!and!policy!relevance,!learn!from!one!another,!and!
copy!proven!“recipes!for!success.”!!

•

Cooptation:!ranging!from!friendly!convergence!on!norms!and!activities,!to!metaW
regulation,!to!hegemony!or!dominance,!with!certain!initiatives!achieving!a!quasiW
monopolistic!position!(e.g.,!Büthe!2010b).!!

•

Chaos:!unpredictable,!undirected!interactions,!sensitive!to!slight!perturbations!and!
displaying!no!clear!pattern.!!

More than one of these may characterize interactions in a given TBG domain. Interactions
between the same actors and institutions may, for example, exhibit competition and cooperation
simultaneously (e.g. Koppell 2010). Moreover, there may be dynamic transitions between
categories, for example with initial chaos developing into competition as schemes vie for
adherents, then coordination as they converge on standard regulatory recipes, and cooptation as
one scheme corners the regulatory marketplace. Equally, coordination might devolve into
competition or chaos.
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In the case of competition, analysis centres on which strategies are used to gain dominance in
the struggle: for example, appeals to the profit motives of target firms or to broader audiences via
norms and legitimation (e.g., Bernstein & Cashore 2007; Gulbrandsen 2010). In the case of
coordination, it is important to note that interactions, and information about them, can both be
asymmetric. For example, it is doubtful that the ILO or ISO has a record of every regulatory
scheme that references its standards. Coordination may also be direct or indirect. Indirect
coordination includes common cognitive framing of a problem or a set of shared goals. Direct
coordination may take place through hierarchy, network or peer-to-peer interaction.
Of these, hierarchy is surprisingly common. Where organizations are “nested” (Aggarwal
1998), coherence is relatively easy to achieve, as the hierarchically superior regime can resolve
conflicts. For example, in food safety, the Codex Alimentarius Commission is the dominant
standards body; local standard-setters must formulate standards within the framework it has set.
Alternatively, or in addition, hierarchical interactions may be based on divisions of labor: one
scheme may enroll another to perform certain regulatory functions, as FSC and MSC enroll
Accreditation Services International (ASI) to manage certification and chain of custody
processes. Hierarchies may be based on formally agreed power arrangements, or may arise from
legal authority (e.g., the significance of the WTO rules for voluntary standards). Hierarchy may
of course be combined with networked or peer-to-peer interactions. For example, standardsetting TBG schemes may be in a hierarchical relationship with a shared third-party certification
organization but in a peer-to-peer relationship with one another.
Different modes of interaction may arise at different institutional levels. For example, even
if two TBG standard-setting schemes in the same domain do not actively compete, their local
units may compete fiercely over local businesses, as they seek to expand their regulatory share.
This can have a significant effect on interaction dynamics at higher levels.
“Carving out” is another mode of coordination, in which one scheme deliberately shapes
itself around others to fill a perceived gap. This interaction is asymmetric, rather than mutual or
hierarchical, and need not be managed by a “meta” orchestrator. Such interactions appear quite
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common, as each new scheme carves out a distinctive regulatory domain amidst existing state
and non-state schemes (Wood 2003, 2005).
Interactions may also take the form of cooptation: one scheme adopts the rules of another
through referencing or certification, as discussed above. For example, ASI coopts the ISO
accreditation regime by maintaining its practices in line with ISO 17011 standards for
accreditation bodies. Widespread cooptation can produce de facto domination, as the widespread
adoption of ISO accreditation and auditing standards by other standards-setting bodies illustrates.
Domination may also be more deliberate, with a particular scheme maneuvering itself into
recognition by an international body, as the Codex Alimentarius Commission has done (Büthe
2009).
Finally, interactions can simply be chaotic. In a particular domain, schemes may overlap,
each claiming authority and intersecting with others on multiple issues, producing not only
confusion but “substantial impacts on each other in the process” (Young 1996: 6). Whether such
chaos evolves into another mode likely depends on whether the relevant organizations work at
cross-purposes or pursue similar goals, whether their rules are compatible, and whether they
perform complementary functions. As a mode of interaction, however, chaos cannot be
discounted.

3.5.)What)are)the)effects)of)interactions?)
Scholars have employed various analytical frameworks to study the effects of TBGI. As
discussed above, several studies focus on whether competitive interactions lead to a “race to the
bottom” or “race to the top”, in terms of the stringency of standards (e.g., Cashore et al. 2004;
Overdevest 2004; Smith & Fischlein 2010; Bartley 2007b). Others emphasize homogenization,
standardization and isomorphism, focusing more on whether and why significant differences
persist between schemes than on social impacts (e.g., Dingwerth & Pattberg 2009; Bartley
2011a). The familiar division between outputs, outcomes and impacts is a useful starting point
for analysis (Underdal 2004). While impacts on social or environmental conditions are of course
the ultimate concern, they are very difficult to isolate and quantify due to the number of variables
in play and the multiplicity and complexity of causal chains. More immediate effects are more
tractable, but highly diverse. Analysis might focus, for example, on the regulatory outputs of
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interaction, such as institutional features of TBG schemes, or norms and their uptake by targets;
or it might investigate regulatory outcomes (changes in target behavior).
Moving beyond the output-outcome-impact cascade, we suggest asking an intermediate
question: what are the effects of interactions on regulatory capacity and performance? Capacity
and performance are enhanced by harnessing the diverse motivations, competencies and
resources of the actors seeking to participate in or control a regulatory space. Analysts might ask,
then, how successful is the process of enrolling, mobilizing or orchestrating the actors whose
contributions are essential to achieving regulatory goals? This can be asked both of TBG
schemes and of the larger regulatory complex. While early regime complexity scholarship
focused on the negative consequences of institutional overlap for regulatory effectiveness, more
recent studies focus on relationships beyond overlap and point to potentially productive
interactions. For example, interactions may promote innovation and experimentation, as well as
local adaptability and flexibility (Keohane & Victor 2011; Sabel & Zeitlin 2008; Overdevest &
Zeitlin, this issue). The regime interplay literature (Oberthür & Gehring 2011) emphasizes that
“synergy” is at least as common as “conflict”, at least in the environmental field.
For TBG schemes, inconsistency with state-based rules may occur, but is typically resolved
through legal hierarchy. TBG schemes may compete, but synergies among them may increase
over time, as they increase actor choice, complement public standards and address problems in
diverse ways (Abbott 2012). The existence of multiple TBG schemes may serve to recruit
additional constituencies to address a given problem, produce greater overall regulatory capacity,
or prompt greater uptake of norms by producers, retailers and other actors. Interaction among
TBG schemes within a particular domain may also lead to common cognitive framings of
problems and goals, norms and ways of acting, as well as discourses that broaden engagement
and facilitate further interactions. On the other hand, multiplicity may dilute regulatory capacity
and performance as schemes work at cross-purposes and targets seek out the least demanding
rules. Simply put, the effects of interaction will vary with the empirical context.
#
#
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3.6.#Development#over#time##
Finally, interactions are fluid and dynamic; a snapshot of interactions frozen at a moment in

time has little analytical value. Over time, interaction may lead TBG schemes to converge or
diverge in institutional design, membership, standards or other parameters. It may diffuse ideas
and practices from one place or sector to others, spurring processes of mutual adaptation and
learning. It may result in concentration or fragmentation of regulatory markets, proliferation or
withering away of TBG schemes. Standards may become more stringent or lax; enforcement
may become more formal and legalistic, or less. Given the multiplicity of actors, levels, and
mechanisms of interaction, there are good reasons to expect TBG – and the wider regulatory
complexes it helps constitute – to be characterized by unintended consequences, tipping points
and emergent properties. An account of TBG interactions should address such temporal
dynamics across all dimensions of regulatory governance.
For example, a domain may initially be characterized by one or a few unstable, weakly
institutionalized schemes. Many start as small groups of interested individuals, and then move to
formal organization. As the FSC illustrates, a TBG scheme may gradually become more widely
adopted within its domain. Its success may lead to it becoming a model for other schemes in the
same or other domains. MSC, for example, imitated FSC’s organizational structure, standards
model, labeling and certification, and even its accreditation body, ASI, leading to more
numerous interactions with other schemes. A meta-organization such as the ISEAL Alliance
may then bring together now-stable schemes as models, institutionalizing that model and
bringing further stabilization, and further interactions.
However, the nature of these temporal processes must be probed. For example, the theory of
punctuated equilibrium (Hall 1993) may not pertain. Moreover, there may be different patterns
of change across particular dimensions of regulatory governance. Disaggregating interactions
into components of the regulatory process, as proposed here, makes it easier to see whether, for
example, apparent stability at the level of stated goals in fact masks paradigmatic changes at the
level of implementation (Howlett & Cashore 2009; Black et al 2005). Individual theoretical
perspectives may not capture the full range of shifts in constellations of organizations and their
cognitive, normative or communicative structures, such as the recharacterization of problems and
solutions (e.g., re-conceptualizing plant genetic rights from common heritage to private property,
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Raustiala & Victor 2004). Hence it is all the more important to draw on a number of theoretical
perspectives, as exemplified in this special issue.

4.))Conclusion)
This article has demonstrated the value of studying TBG interactions and their effects. As we
have clearly indicated, this is a highly complex issue. We have therefore proposed an analytical
framework that can be used by scholars in a variety of theoretical traditions to gain purchase on
this difficult topic. Our framework is rooted in a regulatory governance perspective that views
TBG as a dynamic, co-regulatory and co-evolutionary process, involving state, non-state and
hybrid actors and organizations that pursue varied interests and seek “regulatory share” (Black
2009), have different regulatory capacities, and interact at multiple levels and in multiple ways,
with a range of effects. What makes our framework distinctive is its focus on the regulatory
governance process. The framework (Table 1) is based on disaggregating this process and
focusing on the points in the process at which interactions may occur. At each point, we suggest
a series of analytical questions that highlight the key features of TBG interactions: who or what
is interacting; what drives and shapes interactions; what are the mechanisms and pathways of
interaction; what is the character of interaction; what are the effects of interaction; and how does
interaction change over time?
While the ultimate goal remains to assess the impacts of interactions on the attainment of
societal ends, we suggest a more modest initial focus on effects on regulatory capacity and
performance. Can we isolate the effects of interactions on regulatory capacity, and on the
performance of the regulatory system? The conditions for effective capacity and performance
include some degree of shared interests, goals, and understandings; enrolment and orchestration
of needed resources; mechanisms to promote compliance; and the like. In this respect, we can
draw on existing work on TBG schemes, the literature on responses to international norms and
the regulatory governance literature for insights. Yet such an approach still faces major
conceptual and methodological challenges, including which concepts and indicators of capacity
and performance are useful to guide empirical analysis. The analytical framework we propose is
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thus only a first step in addressing these difficult questions; but it is an important one
nonetheless.
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